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Richard H. Franke 
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J. Scott Armstrong 
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Paul M. Vaclavik 
Graduate Student 
Loyola College 
 
Abstract 
 
Corporate cultural emphasis on long-term competitiveness as opposed to shorter-term 
profitability is evaluated in terms of effectiveness in achieving higher profit margins, real 
profitability, and survival in the long term. Competitive orientation continues to have adverse 
impact even with a lag of four decades. If supported by further, multivariate analyses, this 
finding suggests amendments to what has become standard strategic management thinking, 
perhaps in favor of earlier and more conventional microeconomic focus on profits. 
 
Summary 
 
An empirical analysis of long-term capital profitability benefits from competitive managerial 
orientation was provided by Armstrong and Collopy (Journal of Marketing Research, 1996) for 
twenty large American firms over a period of three decades following the measure of corporate 
competitiveness. The current paper extends their analysis of profitability effects of competitive 
orientation for another decade, and adds the corporate performance measures of profit margin, 
real sales growth, and corporate survival. It amends their index of after-tax return on equity by 
adjusting both numerator and denominator for cumulative inflation effects, yielding real capital 
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profitability measures for each year from 1955 to 1997. (The technique for this adjustment is 
provided in another SMS 1998 paper on “quantitative case analysis.”) It also adds to 
competitiveness as an explanatory variable the fundamental capitalistic and technological index 
of capital intensity.  
Results show that even in the long term (four decades later) competitiveness can have 
detrimental effects upon real capital profitability, upon profit margin, and upon survival, for this 
diverse-industry set of twenty corporations in comparative analysis. In addition to 
competitiveness, the capital intensity and technology index of real capital intensity had beneficial 
effects, at least across the technologically diverse set of firms. The finding is conceptually at 
odds with Buzzell and Gale's important 1987 PIMS volume, and with most of the time-series 
analyses to date utilizing quantitative case analysis for single firms. This first step into cross-
sectional multivariate analysis using Armstrong and Collopy’s set of twenty firms rated as to 
competitive orientation suggests that additional industry and corporate variables need to be 
considered. In addition, time-series results for each of the twenty firms will be presented that 
demonstrate effects of external economic, political, and regulatory factors and of an initial set of 
internal economic and strategic variables. 
Corporate historical comparison for the half century since World War II suggests 
limitations to benefits from the use of models such as those of Porter (1980), Competitive 
Strategy or of Japanese strategic management in Abegglen and Stalk (1985), Kaisha. Further 
analysis supports Armstrong and Collopy’s conclusion that managers should focus on profits 
rather than on the performance of others. When extended to the criterion of survival, this finding 
is similar to the conclusion of Toynbee in his study of twenty-one civilizations – that internal 
limitations rather than external threats are the sources of organizational demise. 
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Table 1A. Competitor Orientation and Real Return on Equity 
Real Return on Equity, % After Tax 
(Average of Yearly RRCEs) No.  
Firm 
Competitor 
Orientation 
(1 = low, or 
profit orient.) 55-64 65-74 75-84 85-94 94-97 
l. Du Pont 
General Electric 
Union Carbide 
Alcoa 
Kennecott 
General Motors 
Johns Manville 
SONJ/Exxor 
General Foods 
US Steel/USX 
Int. Harv./Navistar 
Kroger 
13, SOIND/Amoco 
Sears 
Goodyear 
Gulf Oil 
American Can 
Swift 
Great A and P 
20. National Steel 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
8 
8 
9 
10 
10 
10 
10 
11 
11 
10.00 
13.41 
11.14 
5.21 
4.37 
14.24 
7.90 
9.88 
10.44 
4.51 
3.57 
7.13 
4.10 
11.25 
11.41 
10.63 
4.55 
1.65 
5.02 
5.86 
6.76 
10.92 
8.36 
4.90 
4.47 
11.43 
6.95 
9.43 
9.32 
2.82 
3.45 
5.96 
5.73 
10.06 
9.04 
8.59 
3.89 
1.31 
1.33 
5.29
5.07 
10.35 
5.7 
4.30 
1.03 
5.94 
5.47 
8.39 
6.91 
1.06 
-3.14 
5.94 
7.57 
5.86 
4.87 
6.19 
2.65 
— 
-0.27 
2.04
5.72 
10.26 
2.82 
3.78 
— 
4.43 
— 
6.06 
— 
0.65 
— 
5.95 
4.81 
4.85 
4.26 
— 
— 
— 
3.05 
— 
7.89 
12.45 
4.87 
4.50 
— 
7.52 
— 
6.13 
— 
1.79 
— 
— 
5.03 
483 
4.75 
— 
— 
— 
-0.16 
— 
Note: Acquired, bankrupt, or poison-pilled where data absent. 
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Table 1B. Competitor Orientation and Return on Sales (Margin) 
 
Return on Sales, % After Tax 
(Average of Yearly ROSs) No.  
Firm 
Competitor 
Orientation 
(1 = low, or 
profit orient.) 55-64 65-74 75-84 85-94 94-97 
l. Du Pont 
General Electric 
Union Carbide 
Alcoa 
Kennecott 
General Motors 
Johns Manville 
SONJ/Exxor 
General Foods 
US Steel/USX 
Int. Harv./Navistar 
Kroger 
13, SOIND/Amoco 
Sears 
Goodyear 
Gulf Oil 
American Can 
Swift 
Great A and P 
20. National Steel 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
8 
8 
9 
10 
10 
10 
10 
11 
11 
19.19 
5.58 
10.38 
6.93 
15.77 
8.47 
7.10 
9.53 
5.25 
7.26 
3.94 
1.16 
7.67 
4.86 
4.70 
12.06 
4.15 
.68 
1.02 
690 
10.10 
4.62 
7.43 
6.49 
13.59 
6.88 
6.61 
836 
5.18 
4.72 
2.83 
.95 
9.22 
5.10 
4.50 
10.45 
3.29 
.58 
.72 
579
5.12 
6.37 
5.32 
5.48 
3.11 
3.66 
5.09 
5.21 
3.52 
1.86 
-4.64 
.94 
7.38 
3.82 
2.87 
4.70 
2.20 
— 
-.09 
1.38
5.82 
7.35 
3.63 
4.61 
— 
2.99 
— 
5.84 
— 
.85 
— 
.91 
6.86 
2.83 
2.96 
— 
— 
— 
1.65 
— 
7.88 
8.73 
10.84 
4.94 
— 
3.59 
— 
6.03 
— 
3.33 
— 
— 
7.58 
3.50 
3.57 
— 
— 
— 
-.07 
— 
Note: Acquired, bankrupt, or poison-pilled where data absent. 
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Table 1C. Competitor Orientation and Capital Intensity (Real) 
 
Capital Intensity, 1992 $ per Employee 
(Real Return on Equity per Employee) 
in thousands 
No.  
Firm 
Competitor 
Orientation 
(1 = low, or 
profit orient.) 55-64 65-74 75-84 85-94 94-97
  l. Du Pont 
  2. General Electric 
  3. Union Carbide 
  4. Alcoa 
  5. Kennecott 
  6. General Motors 
  7. Johns Manville 
  8. SONJ/Exxor 
  9. General Foods 
10. US Steel/USX 
11. Int. Harv./Navistar 
12. Kroger 
13, SOIND/Amoco 
14. Sears 
15. Goodyear 
16. Gulf Oil 
17. American Can 
18. Swift 
19. Great A and P 
20. National Steel 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
6 
6 
6 
6 
8 
8 
9 
10 
10 
10 
10 
11 
11 
205 
32 
96 
109 
309 
57 
69 
241 
101 
126 
87 
34 
375 
37 
29 
270 
93 
72 
317 
138 
172 
35 
99 
150 
343 
69 
90 
363 
96 
152 
79 
35 
463 
45 
43 
401 
98 
100 
41 
162
191 
62 
131 
228, 
445 
92 
113 
538 
100 
240 
126 
110 
637 
63 
56 
559 
128 
— 
71 
179
267 
117 
236 
253 
— 
111 
— 
846 
— 
566 
— 
189 
771 
68 
72 
— 
— 
— 
71 
— 
340 
211 
1,008 
179 
— 
110 
— 
1,236 
— 
786 
— 
— 
968 
87 
100 
— 
— 
— 
58 
—
Note: Acquired, bankrupt, or poison-pilled where data absent. 
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Table2A. Pearson Correlation of Real Return on Equity and Return on Sales with 
Competitor Orientation and Capital Intensity (using all available data for then-
surviving firms) 
 
 Competitor Orientation Capital Intensity 
Real Return  
on Equity 
(RROE) 
COMPOR CI55-64 CI65-74 CI75-84 CI85-90 CI94-97 
55-64 -.34 -.23 -.19 -.26 -.44 -.23 
65-74 -.33 -.06 -.01 -.07 -.17 -.06 
75-84 -.26 .09 .16 .17 .20 .26 
85-90 -.28 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.12 -.15 
94-97 -.63* .02 -.03 -.05 -.09 -.06 
Return on 
Sales (OS) 
      
55-64 -.56* .65** .55*  .48* .29 .33 
65-74 -.45* .78** .73** .69** .52 .52 
75-84 -.40 .37 .40 .37 .39 . 40 
85-90 -.49 -.57 .55 .49 .36 .29 
94-97 -.73* .39 .31 .26 .25 .51 
* Signif.. LE .05 ** Signif. LE .01  (2-tailed) 
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Table2b. Pearson Correlation of Real Return on Equity and Return on Sales with 
Competitor Orientation and Capital Intensity (using data only for the 11 firms 
surviving intact to 1997) 
 
 Competitor Orientation Capital Intensity 
Real Return  
on Equity 
(RROE) 
COMPOR CI55-64 CI65-74 CI75-84 CI85-90 CI94-97 
55-64 -.34 -.45 -.46 -.49 -35 -.23 
65-74 -.29 -.18 -.15 -.16 -.19 -.06 
75-84 -.41 .27 .30 .29 .21 .26 
85-90 -.32 .00 .01 -.01 -.01 -.15 
94-97 -.63* -.02 -.03 -.06 -.10 -.06 
Return on 
Sales (OS) 
      
55-64 -.64* .47         .31        .23 .26 .33 
65-74 -.52 .72* 65*       .58 .53 .53 
75-84 -.57 .56 .53          .50 .38 .40 
85-90 -.46 .53 .51          .47 .34 .27 
94-97 -.73* .39 .31          .26 .25 .50 
* Signif.. LE .05 ** Signif. LE .01  (2-tailed) 
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Table 3. Regression Equations of Real Return on Equity and Return on Sales upon 
Competitor Orientation and Capital Intensity (using all available data from then-
surviving firms) 
 
Real Return on Equity 
 
RROE5564 = 10.1234 – 0.361 CompOr, where Rsq = 11.89% 
  t = -1.56 
  (p = .05, 1-tailed) 
 
RROE6574 = 8.132 – 0.285 CompOr, where Rsq = 10.07% 
  t = -1.47 
  (p = 0.79, 1-tailed) 
 
RROE7584  No regression equation 
 
RROE8590 No regression equation 
 
RROE9497 = 8.332 – 0.545 CompOr, Where Rsq = 40.13% 
   t = -2.46 
   (p = .036) 
 
Return on Sales 
 
ROS5564 = 7.889 + 0.0000280 CI5564 – 0.672 CompOr, where Rsq = 67% 
              and adj. Rsq = 64% 
  t = 4.37 t = 3.66 
  (p = .0004) (p = .002) 
 
ROS6574 = 5.806 + 0.0000193 CI6574 – 0.454 CompOr, where Rsq = 75% 
              and adj. Rsq = 72% 
  t = 6.10 t = 3.84 
  (p = .00005) (p = .001) 
 
ROS7584 = 4.098 - 0.329 CompOr – 0.00000588 CI7584, where Rsq = 32% 
              and adj. Rsq = 72% 
  t = -2.04 t = 1.93 
  (p = .058) (p = .07) 
 
ROS8590 = 5.523 – 0.298 CompOr, where Rsq = 24.48% 
  t = -1.80 
  (p = .10) 
 
RO9497 = 7.050 -0.546 CompOr + 0.00000288 CI0407, where Rsq = 70.% 
           and adj. Rsq = 63% 
  t = 3.41 t = 2.10 
  (p = .01) (p = .07) 
